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Abstract. It has recently been shown that neural networks but also
other classifiers are vulnerable to so called adversarial attacks e.g. in
object recognition an almost non-perceivable change of the image changes
the decision of the classifier. Relatively fast heuristics have been proposed
to produce these adversarial inputs but the problem of finding the optimal
adversarial input, that is with the minimal change of the input, is NP-
hard. While methods based on mixed-integer optimization which find the
optimal adversarial input have been developed, they do not scale to large
networks. Currently, the attack scheme proposed by Carlini and Wagner
is considered to produce the best adversarial inputs. In this paper we
propose a new attack scheme for the class of ReLU networks based on a
direct optimization on the resulting linear regions. In our experimental
validation we improve in all except one experiment out of 18 over the
Carlini-Wagner attack with a relative improvement of up to 9%. As our
approach is based on the geometrical structure of ReLU networks, it is
less susceptible to defences targeting their functional properties.
Keywords: adversarial manipulation, robustness of classifiers.
1 Introduction
In recent years it has been highlighted that state-of-the-art neural networks
are highly non-robust: small changes to an input image, which are basically
non-perceivable for humans, change the classifier decision and the wrong decision
has even high confidence [23,6]. This calls into question the usage of neural
networks in safety-critical systems e.g. medical diagnosis systems or self-driving
cars and opens up possibilities to actively attack an ML system in an adversarial
way [18,13,12]. Moreover, this non-robustness has also implications on follow-
up processes like interpretability. How should we be able to interpret classifier
decisions if very small changes of the input lead to different decisions?
This started an arms race looking for both effective defences against adversarial
manipulations and new, sophisticated attacking methods to generate adversarial
inputs [26]. In the end it turned out that most proposed defences were proven to
be ineffective against attacks of type other than that considered by the defence
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itself [4,2]. Regarding adversarial attacks one can distinguish between exact
methods which find the optimal adversarial input with respect to different lp-
norms e.g. wrt to l1-norm [3], l∞-norm [10] and recently lp for p = 1, 2,∞ in [24].
The problem is in general NP-hard [10] and can be formulated as a mixed-integer
optimization problem [24] which does not scale to large networks. Therefore early
on fast heuristics were proposed to produce adversarial attacks [6,9,21,14] as this
is important when one wants to use them in adversarial training to robustify
the networks. More recently, there has been a focus on methods in the middle
range which are close the optimal adversarial input but are still scalable to larger
networks, where currently the attack of Carlini and Wagner (CW-attack) [5] is
considered to be state-of-the-art.
Another line of research provides robustness guarantees by giving lower bounds
on the norm of the minimal perturbation necessary to change the class [8,19,25]
but these methods are restricted to one hidden layer [8,19] or rather shallow
networks [25] and do not provide adversarial examples.
In this paper we propose a new method for the generation of adversarial
inputs for ReLU feedforward neural networks which exploits only the underlying
geometric structure of the classifier which are well known to result in continuous
piecewise affine functions [1]. We show that on each region where the classifier is
affine (linear region) the problem of finding adversarial inputs is thus a quadratic
program for p = 2. However, as the number of linear regions grows exponentially
with depth it is typically impossible to check all of them and thus we propose an
efficient exploration strategy. Finally, because of its geometric nature and our
random exploration scheme our attack is more resistant to defences which are
based on functional properties of the model like gradient based ones. It produces
adversarial inputs of high quality outperforming the current state-of-the-art
CW-attack [5] on almost all architectures and three data sets which we tested
with a relative improvement of up to 9%.
2 Local linear representation of ReLU networks
In the following we consider multi-class classifiers f : Rd → RK where d is the
input dimension and K the number of classes. It is well known that feedforward
neural networks which use ReLU activation functions and are linear in the output
layer yield continuous piecewise affine functions for each output component, see
e.g. [1]. Also residual and convolutional networks with ReLU (as well as leaky
ReLU) activation function or max/sum/avg pooling layers lead to continuous
piecewise affine classifier functions. However, as these architectures require special
care, for simplicity we restrict ourselves to fully connected neural networks.
Definition 1. A function h : Rd → R is called piecewise affine if there exists a
finite set of polytopes {Qr}Mr=1 (linear regions of h) such that ∪Mr=1Qr = Rd and
h is an affine function when restricted to every Qr.
We derive now, given an input point x, the explicit formulation of the linear
counterpart of f for x and the polytope Q(x) to which x belongs (and on which
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the f is an affine function). Note that this description need not be unique when
x lies on the boundary between two or more linear regions. But as this is a set of
measure zero it does not play any role in practice.
Let L+ 1 be the total number of layers and denote the weights and biases by
W (l) ∈ Rnl×nl−1 and b(l) ∈ Rnl for l = 1, . . . , L+ 1 where n0 = d and nL+1 = K.
We define the feedforward network in the usual recursive way, where for x ∈ Rd
we define g(0)(x) = x and the output of the k-th layer before and after applying
componentwise the ReLU activation function σ : R→ R, σ(t) = max{0, t} as
f (k)(x) =W (k)g(k−1)(x) + bk, and g(k)(x) = σ(f (k)(x)), k = 1, . . . , L.
The final classifier function is given as f (L+1)(x) =W (L+1)g(L)(x) + b(L+1) and
decisions are made using argmax
r=1,...,K
f
(L+1)
r (x). We define the diagonal matrices
∆(l), Σ(l) ∈ Rnl×nl for l = 1, . . . , L with entries defined as
∆(l)(x)ij =
{
sign(f (l)i (x)) if i = j,
0 else.
, Σ(l)(x)ij =
{
1 if i = j, f (l)i (x) > 0,
0 else.
.
The matrices ∆(l) are used later to derive the boundaries of the polytope, while
the matrices Σ(l) are the linear equivalent to ReLU functions at a specific point.
This allows us to write f (k)(x) in terms of matrix and vector products as
f (k)(x) =W (k)Σ(k−1)
(
W (k−1)Σ(k−2)
(
. . .
(
W (1)x+ b(1)
)
. . .
)
+ b(k−1)
)
+ b(k).
This can be further rewritten as f (k)(x) = V (k)x+ a(k), with V (k) ∈ Rnk×d and
a(k) ∈ Rnk , where
V (k) =W (k)
k−1∏
l=1
Σ(k−l)W (k−l), a(k) = b(k) +
k−1∑
l=1
( k−l∏
m=1
W (k+1−m)Σ(k−m)
)
b(l).
Note that V (k) and a(k) are accessible via a forward-pass through the network
with only slightly increased overhead compared to the normal effort required
for computing the output for a given input x. The polytope Q(x) can now be
described by the inequalities
Q(x) =
{
z ∈ Rd
∣∣∣∆(l)(x)(V (l)z + a(l)) ≥ 0, l = 1, . . . , L},
where the diagonal matrix ∆(l)(x) contains the information on which part of the
hyperplane x lies. In total one gets N =
∑L
l=1 nl inequality constraints describing
the polytope and N represents also the total number of hidden neurons of the
network. We denote the set of the inequalities defining Q(x) as S(Q(x)).
Finally, the multi-class classifier is described on Q(x) by the affine function
f (L+1) = V (L+1)x+ a(L+1).
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Then the decision region for a class c on Q(x) is the polytope Pc described by
K − 1 inequalities
Pc =
{
z ∈ Rd ∣∣ 〈V (L+1)c − V (L+1)s , z〉+ a(L+1)c − a(L+1)s ≥ 0 ∀s 6= c} ∩Q(x),
where V (L+1)r is the r-th row of V (L+1). The set Pc is again a polytope since
obtained as intersection of two polytopes. Note that the intersection with Q(x)
is necessary as the linear description for the classifier obtained for x is only valid
on Q(x).
In dependency of the application domain of the classifier there might be also
other constraints which the input has to fulfill such as box constraints in the case
of images. In this case, in all the definitions one has to take the intersection with
this constraint set. Without much loss of generality we assume that such a set
M is also given as a polytope so that the intersections Q(x) ∩M and Pc ∩M
are polytopes as well.
3 Generation of adversarial inputs on the linear regions
We first define the optimization problem for generating adversarial inputs, that
is given a multi-class classifier f : Rd → RK and an input x we want to find the
smallest perturbation x+ δ such that the decision of f for x+ δ is different from
that of x. Typical lp metrics with p ∈ {1, 2,∞} are used to measure the “size” of
the perturbation. In the experiments we choose p = 2, but the framework below
can be easily extended to p ∈ {1,∞}.
Formally, the problem can be described as the following optimization problem
[23]. Suppose that the classifier outputs class c for input x, that is fc(x) =
argmax
j=1,...,K
fj(x) (we assume the decision is unique). The problem of generating the
minimal perturbation x+ δ such that the classifier decision changes is equivalent
to finding the solution of
min
δ∈Rd
‖δ‖p , s.th. max
l 6=c
fl(x+ δ) ≥ fc(x+ δ) and x+ δ ∈ C, (1)
where C is a constraint set which the generated point x+ δ has to satisfy, e.g., an
image has to be in [0, 1]d but more generally we assume C to be a polytope. The
complexity of the optimization problem (1) depends on the classifier f , but it is
typically non-convex (see [10] for a hardness result for ReLU networks). Many
relaxations and approximate solutions of problem (1) have been proposed in the
literature in order to make it computationally tractable, see e.g. [16,5], and for
ReLU networks a few formulations have been proposed for the exact solution
[10,3,24], most notably [24] which uses mixed-integer programming to achieve
this.
However, as we show in the following, the optimization problem (1) can
be solved efficiently on any linear region of f . In fact, given a point y in the
input space we recall from Section 2 that in the polytope Q(y), or equivalently
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inside the linear region containing y and where the classifier is affine, it holds
f(z) = V z + a for some V, a. Thus the optimization problem
δ = argmin
l 6=c
‖δl‖p , (2)
with δl being the solution of
min
δ∈Rd
‖δ‖p , s.th. 〈Vl − Vc, x+ δ〉+ al − ac ≥ 0, x+ δ ∈ C ∩Q(y), (3)
where Vi and ai are respectively the i-th row and component of V and a, is
equivalent to (1) on Q(y). First of all we note that when the class l is fixed and
p = 2 the resulting optimization problem on Q(y) is a convex quadratic program,
whereas for p ∈ {1,∞} it is a linear program. Further constraints in form of a
polytope e.g. box constraints on the input space do not change the type of the
optimization problem. Note that it can in principle happen that there exists no
feasible point if the decision boundary of f does not intersect the linear region
Q(y). Nonetheless, typically one gets at least for one class an adversarial input
in this way.
Although the number of linear regions grows exponentially with the size of
the networks [15,1], it is finite. Thus one can in principle solve (1) by checking
all the linear regions. However, this is clearly infeasible for all possible regions.
Thus we develop in the following a mixed randomized strategy of exploration
and local search which solves (2) just on a small number of linear regions but
nevertheless achieves good quality.
4 A linear regions based method to generate adversarial
examples
As pointed out in the previous section, solving a finite number of problems like
(3) suffices to solve problem (1), but enumerating and checking all the linear
regions of a generic classifier is not feasible. In the following we motivate our
randomized strategy together with several ways to speed-up the computations
by either avoiding to solve the QPs by simple checks or how to speed up the QP
computation itself.
It is clear that the solution of the QP (3) is typically attained at a face
of Q(y) and the solution lies on the decision boundary. At first sight it looks
as the optimal next step, after finding a first adversarial input, is to just visit
the neighboring polytope to track the decision boundary. Unfortunately, this
approach does not work in practice as the solution is attained typically at a
face of dimension m < d − 1 (more than one linear constraint of the polytope
is active). Thus the neighboring region is not uniquely defined and the number
of neighboring regions grows roughly exponentially in d − 1 − m. Then, one
would have to check all of them and this is again infeasible. But even if this
was tractable, nevertheless one would still need a strategy in case all of these
neighboring regions just lead to worse adversarial inputs.
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Algorithm 1: rLR-QP
Input : x original image, δWS starting perturbation, L set of target classes,
n1, n2, n3, n4, α hyperparameters
Output : δ adversarial perturbation
1 δ0 ← solution of problem (2) on Q(x) and l ∈ L
2 if ‖δ0‖2 < ‖δWS‖2 then δ ← δ0, u← ‖δ0‖2 else δ ← δWS , u← ‖δWS‖2;
3 Initialize the set S of n1 copies of δ
4 for a1 = 1, ..., n4 do
5 Exploration Step:
6 foreach a2 = 1, ..., n3 do
7 R = ∅
8 for i = 1, ..., n1 do
9 foreach j = 1, ..., n2 do
10 ← random point in B(0, u/a1)
11 R← R ∪ {x+ Si + }
12 end
13 end
14 foreach y ∈ R do
15 δtemp ← solution of problem (2) on Q(y) and l ∈ L
16 if ‖δtemp‖2 < u then δ ← δ0, u← ‖δ‖2;
17 m = argmax
i=1,...,n1
‖Si‖2
18 if ‖δtemp‖2 < αu and ‖δtemp‖2 < ‖Sm‖2 then Replace Sm with
δtemp;
19 end
20 end
21 Local Search Step:
22 foreach j = 1, ..., n2 do
23 ← random point in B(0, u/a1)
24 y ← x+ δ + 
25 δtemp ← solution of problem (2) on Q(y) and l ∈ L
26 if ‖δtemp‖2 < u then δ ← δ0, u← ‖δ‖2;
27 m = argmax
i=1,...,n1
‖Si‖2
28 if ‖δtemp‖2 < αu and ‖δtemp‖2 < ‖Sm‖2 then Replace Sm with δtemp;
29 end
30 end
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This motivates our randomized strategy to select linear regions which is based
on an exploration step, in order to get out of a potential suboptimal valley, and
a local search strategy, where we just check linear regions in the close vicinity
of the current best adversarial input. Please note that we select linear regions
by generating randomly points y and then check the corresponding linear region
Q(y). Note also that in this way we will be biased to visiting linear regions of
high volume, which makes sense as in such way the portion of the input space
checked with a limited number of regions tends to be maximized.
The final scheme is summarized in Algorithm 1, which we refer to as rLR-QP.
Please note that δ is the best adversarial input found so far and u = ‖δ‖2. Another
norm than p = 2 can be simply optimized by changing the corresponding convex
optimization problem in (3). We have the possibility to use adversarial inputs
from another method as initialization. Later on we initialize our method with
DeepFool [16] to speed up the procedure. As a first step the algorithm checks the
linear region Q(x) which contains the original input x. This region contains in
some cases already the optimal adversarial input. After this initialization phase
the algorithm alternates between the exploration step and the local search step.
In the exploration step we keep a set of adversarial inputs which are up to α times
suboptimal, where α = 1.5 in all experiments, and search in their neighborhood.
This exploration phase prevents the method to be too much focused on only one
region and explores a larger neighborhood of x. The second phase is the local
search step where we search in a smaller neighborhood around the best adversarial
input found so far. Note that our random sampling on B(0, u) is uniform in the
direction and uniform in the radius (this means we are not sampling from the
uniform distribution on B(0, u)). The reason is that we want to have a higher
probability for checking also smaller radii, whereas for uniform sampling in high
dimensions the samples would be very close to the surface of the sphere.
The parameters n1, n2, n3, n4 can be used to tune the total number of linear
regions that are explored and consequently the runtime of the algorithm. In fact,
we have that overall M = 1 + (n1 · n3 + 1) · n2 · n4 points are picked during the
process, so that M is an upper bound on how many linear regions are checked
(we make sure not to check the same region twice). For the experiments we fix
n1, n2 = 10, n3 = 5, n4 = 3.
5 Experiments
In the experiments we compare the performances of our method rLR-QP with
different state-of-the-art methods. First, we compare our algorithm with an
exact method for a small networks guaranteed to find the optimal adversarial
input. Second, we apply our method on larger networks, trained both on the
original training set and with adversarial training as described in [14]. Finally,
we test how the number of points checked by rLR-QP improves the quality of
the outcome. In all cases, we analyse our results in relation to those obtained by
the Carlini-Wagner l2-attack [5] (CW ), as it is considered to be state-of-the-art
method to produce high quality adversarial examples, and DeepFool [16], as it is
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Fig. 1: Effectiveness of attacks. Sorted ratios of the norm of the perturbation found by the
attacking methods over the norm of the optimal solution provided by MIP (computed on the first 50
images of MNIST test set). Left: performance of CW l2-attack on network N1. Right: performance
of L-BFGS on network N2. In both cases one observes that on about 70% of the points the attacks
find solutions close to the optimal ones, while there are approximately 30% of examples where the
difference becomes significant and for a few of them even large.
Table 1: Relative quality of generated adversarial examples. We report the average and the
maximum value of the ratios between the 2-norms of the adversarial inputs found by the indicated
method and the optimal adversarial inputs generated by the MIP method [24] (smaller is better).
Two neural networks N1 (one hidden layer), N2 (two hidden layers) have been trained on MNIST.
The statistics have been computed with the first 50 images of the test set of MNIST. Please notice
that our method finds the optimal solution for all 50 test images. All other methods are, sometimes
quite significantly, worse.
rLR-QP (ours) DeepFool L-BFGS CW
mean max mean max mean max mean max
N1 1.0000 1.0000 1.1226 1.6059 1.2749 2.2936 1.0269 1.4546
N2 1.0000 1.0000 1.1426 1.5953 1.0180 1.3457 1.0686 1.4517
a very fast method providing already good to high quality adversarial examples
which we use as initialization.
Comparison with provably optimal solutions In [24] problem (1) is solved
using a mixed integer programming reformulation. Since we want to evaluate
the quality of adversarial examples found by our method (rLR-QP), we compare
them to the minimal solutions obtained as in [24] (MIP). Moreover, we also
report the performances of other three attacks: DeepFool, L-BFGS [23] and the
CW l2-attack. We train two small neural networks on MNIST dataset: N1 with
1 hidden layer of 50 units and N2 with 2 hidden layers of 50 and 15 units. For
our method we use the outcome of DeepFool as starting point and perform the
search over all the 9 target classes. We consider the first 50 images of the test set
for the evaluation of adversarial inputs.
We report both the average and the maximum of the ratios ‖δ‖2/‖δMIP ‖2, where
δ is the perturbation provided by a certain attack while δMIP is the provably
optimal solution of (1) given by MIP. As Table 1 shows, rLR-QP finds the
optimal solution for all 50 test inputs. The other methods instead perform worse
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and even when the mean is not far from 1 the maximum reaches high values. This
behavior is illustrated in Figure 1 where all the 50 ratios are reported for both
CW on N1 and L-BFGS on N2 in increasing order. These are the two settings
with the best mean performance (N1/CW : 1.027, N2/L-BFGS : 1.018). We see in
Figure 1 that in both cases there are a few outliers on which the performance of
the attacks is significantly worse compared to the optimum.
Since it is difficult to provide a fair, complete comparison of the runtime of
different methods, we highlight that rLR-QP takes on average around 2 seconds
on N1 and less than 0.5 seconds on N2 to perform on a single image, without any
sort of parallelization (see below for further details). We have a shorter time on
a more complex network for different reasons. First, the time needed to solve the
QPs depends significantly to the size of the optimal solutions themselves (smaller
perturbations are usually faster to be computed). Moreover, we did not conduct a
wide search in order to tune the hyperparameters n1, ..., n4 described in Section 4,
so one might get the same results with smaller computational effort. On the other
side, although we reimplemented the MIP algorithm and our implementation
might be suboptimal, MIP requires more than 1000 seconds to complete a run
on one image.
Main experiments In order to evaluate our method in the task of finding
adversarial examples in different settings, we choose three fully connected neural
networks with increasing size and depth: 1× 1024 with one hidden layer of 1024
units, 5 × 1024 having 5 hidden layers containing 1024 units each (thus, 5120
hidden units overall) and 10× 1024 consisting of 10 hidden layers with 1024 units
each (10240 units). Every architecture is trained on three data sets: MNIST,
German Traffic Sign (GTS) [22] and CIFAR-10 [11]. Moreover, for each of the
previous combinations we train a model on the plain set and another integrating
adversarial training (at), using the PGD attack of [14]. However, since we focus
on the l2-norm, we adapted the implementation from [17] to perform the plain
gradient update instead of the gradient sign (which corresponds to l∞-norm
and thus is irrelevant for the l2-norm case) on every iteration. We perform 100
iterations of the PGD attack for every batch. During the training, every batch
contains 50% of adversarial and 50% of clean examples.
We apply both DeepFool, in the implementation of [20], and CW l2-attack.
For the latter we use its untargeted formulation provided by [17], keeping the
settings of the original paper [5] and their code, including 20 restarts, 10000
iterations, learning rate 0.01 and initial constant of 0.001.
We use DeepFool as initialization. As we noted that the solution given by DeepFool
is usually not on the surface representing the boundary between different classes,
we conduct a fast binary search over the segment joining the original point x
and the adversarial example of DeepFool x+ δDF in order to find the decision
boundary. In fact, thanks to the continuity of the classifier f , there exists at least
one point on that segment which is still an adversarial example but closer to the
clean image. Explicitly we have that
∃l s.th. fc(x)− fl(x) > 0 and fc(x+ δDF ) < fl(x+ δDF )
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Table 2: Main experiments. We present the statistics of a range of different neural networks
trained on different data sets. In particular, we compare the results obtained for networks trained
on the plain training set and with adversarial training (at). Mean, minimum and maximum refer to
the values of
∥
δCW
∥
2/
∥∥δrLR−QP∥∥2 for CW and ∥δDF∥2/∥∥δrLR−QP∥∥2 for DeepFool computed
on respectively the first 1000, 700 and 500 images of the test set for 1, 5 and 10 hidden layers models.
The improvement rate IR represents the percentage of points on which the norm of perturbation
provided by our method is smaller compared to that of the other attack. The number of points where
the attack, either CW or DeepFool, does not provide an adversarial example is indicated in brackets
after the IR. The statistics do not include these points which is an advantage for our competitors.
data set model CW DeepFoolmean min max IR % mean min max IR %
MNIST
1× 1024 plain 1.029 0.827 1.474 94.4 1.157 1.000 13.861 99.9(1)
1× 1024 at 1.066 0.454 2.434 83.3 2.107 1.000 26.179 100(49)
5× 1024 plain 1.021 0.496 1.471 89.3 1.120 1.001 6.060 100(8)
5× 1024 at 1.013 0.585 1.880 75.1 1.404 1.000 11.009 100(4)
10× 1024 plain 0.989 0.704 1.535 47.8 1.188 1.000 1.768 100(5)
10× 1024 at 0.997 0.270 1.507 67.7(61) 2.084 1.000 5.518 100(4)
GTS
1× 1024 plain 1.064 0.936 2.065 91.0 1.087 1.000 15.770 96.6
1× 1024 at 1.065 0.931 1.944 94.5 1.094 1.000 2.935 99.0
5× 1024 plain 1.034 0.509 2.213 79.7 1.222 1.001 2.116 100
5× 1024 at 1.036 0.314 3.160 80.1 1.308 1.000 3.248 100
10× 1024 plain 1.023 0.563 5.067 76.6(1) 1.346 1.000 4.254 99.8
10× 1024 at 1.016 0.533 2.082 68.4 1.583 1.003 3.889 100
CIFAR
1× 1024 plain 1.090 0.926 1.802 98.3 1.056 1.000 1.966 99.8
1× 1024 at 1.080 0.998 1.585 99.9 1.049 1.000 2.747 99.9
5× 1024 plain 1.082 0.825 1.783 96.0 1.096 1.001 4.166 100
5× 1024 at 1.065 0.769 1.627 94.4 1.090 1.001 1.843 100
10× 1024 plain 1.073 0.721 2.225 86.4 1.212 1.002 2.143 100
10× 1024 at 1.079 0.644 1.650 86.4 1.160 1.000 1.700 99.8
which implies
∃δ∗ ∈ conv(0, δDF ) s.th. fc(x+ δ∗) = fl(x+ δ∗).
Then, we use the approximated x+ δ∗ as warm start for our method. If DeepFool
cannot provide an adversarial example, we perform the linear search between the
original point and the origin of Rd to get the starting point. Moreover, for the 1
hidden layer networks we perform the search of adversarial examples over all the
possible target classes, while in the case of 5 and 10 hidden layers we consider
only the class the warm start belongs to.
In Table 2 we report, for each setting, mean, minimum and maximum of
the ratios ‖δCW ‖2/‖δrLR−QP ‖2 and ‖δDF ‖2/‖δrLR−QP ‖2, where δCW , δDF , δrLR−QP
are the perturbations provided respectively by CW l2-attack, DeepFool and our
method, and the percentage of test cases for which ‖δrLR−QP ‖2 is smaller than
the other attack. We consider the first 1000 images of the test sets for 1× 1024
models, 700 for 5 × 1024 and 500 for 10 × 1024. If an attack does not find an
adversarial example for a certain image we do not include it in the computations
A randomized gradient-free attack on ReLU networks 11
for the statistics. Notice that, unlike the other methods, rLR-QP always provides
a valid adversarial input for all test instances.
Compared to CW attack, on 16 of the 18 models we get an average improve-
ment between 1.3% and 9.0%, while for 10 × 1024 at on MNIST the mean is
slightly below 1 but CW attack fails to provide an adversarial example on the
12.2% of cases. Thus it is fair to say that in only one of the 18 experiments, our
method is outperformed by the CW attack. The gap is even larger for DeepFool,
where the average gain with our method is up 110%. Note that the benefit given
by the initial binary search is not crucial to achieve this improvement, as can be
seen in Table 3 where the statistics both before and after the linear search are
shown.
More iterations of rLR-QP A natural question is whether allowing our
method to check more linear regions can improve significantly the results or does
our rLR-QP algorithm get stuck in some suboptimal area of the input space.
We consider the neural network 1× 1024 at on MNIST, as it has many points
where our results are worse than those of CW attack. We want to check if for
the images with ‖δCW ‖2/‖δrLR−QP ‖2 < 0.95 an improvement is possible. Then, we
rerun our method, with the same hyperparameters, using the adversarial example
x+ δrLR−QP produced by rLR-QP the first time as warm start for the new run.
Unlike the first application, we restrict the target class to that of the starting
point. Then, we iterate the same procedure a few times, always using the newest
perturbation as starting point.
Table 3 shows the evolution of the statistics and the gradual gain in terms
of quality. It is interesting that, even if the average improvement between the
first and second iterations is the largest, the maximum gain is high also in
the successive steps (it is of 45.7% at the fifth application). Furthermore, the
progressive increase of the mean appears almost constant and this indicates
that further applications of the algorithm will lead to further improvement (for
example the second largest increase of the mean of the ratios, 1.0%, is attained
the sixth time we run the algorithm). Overall, this means that running our
method for a longer time (increasing n4) can yield better solutions.
Implementation details Our algorithm is coded in MATLAB, relies on Gurobi
solver [7] for the optimization processes and runs at the moment on CPUs. As
it is stated in [5] a direct comparison of the runtime of different methods might
be misleading as both implementation and hardware used are hardly similar.
We would like to point out that our technique does not benefit at the moment
of any kind of parallelization. It is however likely that major improvements in
computational speed can be obtained by an adaptation that allows to exploit
completely the hardware potential, including GPUs.
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Table 3: Evolution of quality over time. We here consider the network 1 × 1024 at
trained on MNIST and the 79 images which after the first application of our method have
‖δCW ‖2/
∥∥δrLR−QP∥∥2 < 0.95. We show the statistics (mean, minimum, maximum) of the ratios
‖δCW ‖2/
∥∥δrLR−QP∥∥2 and the number N of points for which ‖δrLR−QP ‖2 < ‖δCW ‖2 before per-
forming our method (that is considering the outcome of DeepFool, without and with the binary
search) and after multiple iterations of it. Moreover, we present the progressive improvement at each
step compared to the previous one. It is clear that there are improvements across all the categories
and in particular for 24 of 79 points we have that the perturbation of our method at the end is
smaller than the one provided by CW.
step CW progr. improv.mean min max N mean max
DeepFool 0.500 0.236∗ 0.893 0 - -
DeepFool + binary search 0.511 0.235 0.893 0 - -
I application of rLR-QP 0.865 0.454 0.949 0 - -
II application of rLR-QP 0.905 0.454 1.292 15 4.9% 44.5%
III application of rLR-QP 0.908 0.550 1.292 16 0.5% 21.2%
IV application of rLR-QP 0.912 0.550 1.292 18 0.4% 12.9%
V application of rLR-QP 0.918 0.550 1.292 20 0.8% 45.7%
VI application of rLR-QP 0.927 0.550 1.292 23 1.0% 30.1%
VII application of rLR-QP 0.930 0.550 1.292 24 0.4% 31.4%
∗ for one point DeepFool does not produce an adversarial input, hence we perform the
binary search on the segment joining the original image and the origin of Rd. We do
not include this point in the statistics for DeepFool and this is why the minimum after
“DeepFool + binary search” is worse than after only DeepFool.
6 Outlook
From the implementation side we will implement the current method using
GPUs or if a full GPU implementation is unreasonable do a mixed CPU-GPU
implementation. The use of GPUs will then allow also to extend the method
easily to convolutional neural networks and related variants which also yield
continuous piecewise affine functions if only max- and avg-pooling are used for
the convolutional layers and ReLU is used for the fully connected layers.
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